High-tech drones are changing warfare – terrorists may soon follow the same playbook
- Written by James Paterson, Teaching Associate in International Relations , Monash University
In June 2024, Ukraine shocked Russian forces with the surprise Operation Spiderweb[1], an unprecedented, coordinated drone strike deep inside Russian territory.
More recently, as part of Operation Rising Lion[2], Israel used drones to destroy Iranian air defences in a highly coordinated opening attack.
These operations[3] were tactically successful, yet strikingly simple and inexpensive. They demonstrate the significant role drones have come to play on the battlefield.
But the same low-cost, easily assembled drone technology could be repurposed by extremists.
Policymakers need to act quickly by making it harder to purchase drone equipment, investing in methods to destroy drones in the air and investing in research into how drones might be used in the future.
How are drones used as weapons?
The use of drones by non-state actors is not new[4].
In 2020, Houthi[5] militants launched a combined missile and drone strike on a Yemeni military training camp, killing 79 and injuring 150.
In January 2024, a drone attack[6] by Kataib Hezbollah killed United States soldiers at a military outpost in Jordan, the first such American fatalities attributed to enemy drones.
Yet, the evolution in drone use as part of the conflict in Ukraine reveals the potential to amplify the threat.
During the past two years, improvements in accessibility[7], affordability[8], range[9] and speed[10] have transformed commercial drones into precision strike platforms capable of inflicting mass casualties at low cost.
Drones having been credited[11] with causing as much as 70% of frontline casualties on both sides in the war in Ukraine.
These innovations are unlikely to remain confined to state actors for long.
Historically[12], insurgent and terrorist groups have borrowed, adapted and repurposed military innovations to suit their needs.
How could terrorists use drones?
Drones in the hands of non-state actors pose the greatest danger on the battlefield but the domestic landscape is far from immune.
One especially vulnerable area is critical infrastructure. Several incidents in recent years highlight this.
Between 2015 and 2019[13], the United States experienced at least 57 drone incursions at two dozen of its nuclear sites.
In 2018[14] and 2019[15], drone sightings shut down major airports in London.
Sydney Airport has reported[16] increasing levels of drone activity in its no-fly zone.
In the US in December 2023[17], drones repeatedly breached restricted airspace above Langley Air Force Base. The US government had no meaningful response to these incursions.
Even more concerning is the potential convergence of extremist ideology and drone capability.
“Accelerationism[18]” – the belief that societal collapse should be hastened – has gained[19] traction among far-right and fringe extremist groups. Critical infrastructure is a prime target: damaging it can both sow public panic while serving the movement’s broader strategic goal of engineering a systemic collapse by destroying key institutions.
So far, most drone-related incidents have not had a malicious intent. However, Ukraine has shown how easily drones can transition from nuisance to lethal weapon.
It is not inconceivable that non-state actors will realise the strategic value[20] of affordable[21], small and commercially available drones[22] that can be used to execute bomb-drop missions[23] and kamikaze-style attacks[24] with relative ease.
However, the operational complexity of Ukraine’s high-end drone tactics should not be understated. Achieving this level of drone innovation requires financial resources, technical skill, infrastructure and bespoke software.
While more established, state-like entities might possess such capabilities, it is less clear whether more fragmented or ideologically disorganised groups, or “lone wolf” actors, can replicate them at scale.
Nevertheless, resource and technological hurdles alone should not be relied on as the only safeguard.
What can be done?
Local and national law enforcement agencies must be equipped with counter-drone tools such as:
But these technologies are expensive[25], and too few are available to cover all potential targets.
Improving the regulation of over-the-counter drone products is also key.
Many drones sold[26] in the US do not include in-built “geofencing” features, which block access to restricted airspaces. There is also no mandate requiring[27] manufacturers to include them.
Australia has a similar regulatory framework, with the Civil Aviation Safety Authority largely relying on user compliance rather than requiring the embedding of safety features. The European Union[28], though, has developed a regulatory framework that requires geo-awareness and geofencing capabilities.
A more urgent challenge is the unregulated DIY drone market. Components can be sourced online and assembled with ease, sometimes using 3D-printed parts.
Malicious actors can tailor drones to bypass geofencing and other safety protocols, while also improving[29] performance capabilities.
Just as 3D-printed firearm components are becoming[30] subject to regulation, policymakers should consider establishing oversight mechanisms for drone parts and manufacturing tools.
One of the most effective ways to curb the misuse of DIY drone technology is to close the anonymity gap in how parts are made and shared. Requiring commercial 3D-printing providers to keep verifiable records of all jobs and to embed serial numbers or digital watermarks (a printer’s fingerprint[31]) into critical printed components would make it far harder to produce and circulate untraceable parts.
In parallel, regulating the distribution of digital blueprints for high-capability drone components, as has been proposed in the United Kingdom[32] for 3D-printed firearm schematics, would prevent the easy online spread of weaponisable designs.
Together, these measures would raise the cost, complexity and risk for extremists. They would also give authorities the tools to quickly trace and disrupt illicit drone manufacturing networks.
If extremist groups are allowed to adapt these technologies faster than governments can respond, we risk entering an era in which the skies are a vector for disruption and terror.
References
- ^ Operation Spiderweb (ua.korrespondent.net)
- ^ Operation Rising Lion (www.csis.org)
- ^ operations (www.foreignaffairs.com)
- ^ new (ctc.westpoint.edu)
- ^ Houthi (orionpolicy.org)
- ^ drone attack (icct.nl)
- ^ accessibility (www.bbc.com)
- ^ affordability (www.wsj.com)
- ^ range (edition.cnn.com)
- ^ speed (www.theguardian.com)
- ^ credited (www.foreignaffairs.com)
- ^ Historically (gnet-research.org)
- ^ Between 2015 and 2019 (www.forbes.com)
- ^ 2018 (www.theguardian.com)
- ^ 2019 (www.bbc.com)
- ^ reported (www.theaustralian.com.au)
- ^ 2023 (www.wsj.com)
- ^ Accelerationism (www.accresearch.org)
- ^ gained (extremism.gwu.edu)
- ^ strategic value (warontherocks.com)
- ^ affordable (www.wsj.com)
- ^ small and commercially available drones (www.gcsp.ch)
- ^ bomb-drop missions (ctc.westpoint.edu)
- ^ kamikaze-style attacks (www.gcsp.ch)
- ^ expensive (www.aspistrategist.org.au)
- ^ sold (www.anzurobotics.com)
- ^ requiring (www.dataguidance.com)
- ^ European Union (eudroneport.com)
- ^ improving (www.sciencedirect.com)
- ^ becoming (3dprint.com)
- ^ a printer’s fingerprint (3dshoes.com)
- ^ United Kingdom (www.parallelparliament.co.uk)
Authors: James Paterson, Teaching Associate in International Relations , Monash University
