On a grim anniversary, an end to Gaza’s violence is suddenly clear – if both sides can make sacrifices
- Written by Eyal Mayroz, Senior Lecturer in Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Sydney
Two years into the most horrific chapter in the history of Israel and Palestine, a glimmer of hope has been offered to both sides by US President Donald Trump’s plan for a permanent ceasefire[1] and initial steps towards a faraway peace, or at least coexistence.
The plan at this stage is extremely vague[2], full of holes and strongly biased toward the Israeli side. However, it currently enjoys robust international support and legitimacy – arguably, stronger than any peace plan in the past two years.
It demands significant concessions from both sides, though much more so for Hamas, with punitive measures[3] for failures to comply.
And it inches closer than any time in the past two years to halting the senseless mass killings and ongoing humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza.
What are the prospects for the plan’s success? What are the obstacles? And how could the world better support the prolonged and difficult process of trying to protect countless innocent lives in this part of the world?
On a grim anniversary, and with both sides exhausted, the answers require careful consideration.
Major concessions on both sides
For Hamas, there are a few immediate benefits to the proposed agreement: Israel’s promises to end the killings in Gaza, allow humanitarian aid to flow, and release numerous Palestinian prisoners.
At the same time, without timelines for a full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and for Palestinian governance in the strip, there are also major risks.
The plan doesn’t include an explicit promise for a Palestinian state that will encompass both Gaza and the West Bank. And the demand for Hamas to disarm and stay out of Palestinian politics would not only abolish the group’s remaining power and influence, but leave its members at the mercy of Israel and American goodwill[4].
For Israel, the return of all hostages, both alive and dead, and the chance to begin to emerge from its diplomatic isolation and pariah status offer significant gains.
However, for the country’s hardline government and its political base, these gains would come at a cost. This includes:
the withdrawal from Gaza without fulfilling Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s promise to fully destroy Hamas
amnesty for Hamas militants who would renounce the armed struggle
the release of 2,000 Palestinian prisoners, including more than 250 with Israeli blood on their hands
forgoing annexation of Gaza and the West Bank, as promised by Trump[5]
acknowledging, even if fuzzily, Palestinian aspirations for sovereignty and self-determination.
These concessions will be ideologically tough and politically destabilising for the current Israeli government.
Arab and Muslim support for the plan
Despite the challenges, the plan’s prospects have been enhanced by a number of factors, at least in the short term.
Key among them has been the overwhelming international support, especially among Arab and Muslim states[6]. This has left Hamas more isolated than ever. The support by its long-time allies, Qatar and Turkey[7], would have been particularly hard for Hamas to swallow.
Notably, this support had been tested by last-minute Israeli changes to the draft[8] that didn’t sit well with some of these states.
However, they grudgingly acquiesced[9] to the changes, given the dire situation in Gaza, the exhaustion of the chief Arab mediators, Trump’s clout, and the realisation that no better plan was likely in the near future.
Also influential was the long-overdue US decision to force Netanyahu into important concessions[10] on allowing aid into Gaza and ending the threats of ethnic cleansing and Israeli annexation of parts of the West Bank and Gaza.
The imminent October 10 deadline for a Nobel Peace Prize announcement may have contributed to Trump’s resolve[11] to pressure both sides – especially Netanyahu – and to the tightly imposed schedule for the release of the plan.
Israeli hostages as a bargaining chip
For the past two years, Hamas’ main bargaining chip was the Israeli hostages it kidnapped on October 7 2023.
A key challenge posed by Trump’s plan is the dictate to release the remaining captives, dead and alive, within the first 72 hours of the deal coming into effect. This would be in exchange for roughly 2,000 Palestinian prisoners.
Effectively, this would not only abolish Hamas’ negotiating power, but also their threat[12] to use the hostages as human shields against the current or a future Israeli military incursion into Gaza City.
However, according to the Israeli newspaper Haaretz[13], Hamas leaders in Qatar were recently persuaded to believe that keeping the hostages had become a liability because Netanyahu’s government was no longer primarily concerned about their safety and would use their likely presence in Gaza City as a pretext for their operations there.
This may have made the benefit of a hostage-prisoner swap more apparent for Hamas.
How the world can help
Beyond ending the immediate crisis in Gaza, the plan’s long-term viability depends on larger questions of Palestinian statehood and governance.
Despite being scorned[14] early on by the US and Israel, an initiative launched[15] in July by France and Saudi Arabia to push for wider recognition of Palestine helped lay the groundwork for the Trump peace plan.
The move extracted an explicit commitment by the Palestinian Authority (PA) to hold democratic elections and undertake other significant reforms. It also helped galvanise a unified Arab position on ending the conflict, with a consequential joint condemnation[16] of Hamas’ October 7 attack and a demand the group disarm and relinquish power in Gaza.
Arguably, the success of Trump’s plan will depend not only on the fast-moving events in the coming days, but also on the international community’s ability to sustain its commitment to a complex peace process in the coming weeks, months and years.
Once the mass violence in Gaza has ended, international attention will wane and make it easier for either side to derail the process. This is why the efforts to recognise Palestinian statehood remain important. With support now from 157 of 193 UN member states[17] – more than 80% of membership – this could increase the pressure on the US to avoid vetoing[18] a full UN membership for Palestine in the future.
Agency matters
Western powers should also reconsider their demands that Hamas be barred from Palestinian politics as a condition for recognition. Genuine Palestinian sovereignty should include the fundamental right of the people to choose their own government through free and fair elections.
It’s inconsistent for these Western states to champion democratic values[19], independence and self-determination for the Palestinians, while simultaneously prescribing which parties[20] can participate in their electoral process.
At the same time, third-party states have the right to articulate the potential diplomatic or economic consequences should Hamas be elected into a future Palestinian government. It would then be up to the Palestinian people to weigh the potential costs when casting their votes.
This approach could provide respect for Palestinian agency, while maintaining the principle that democratic choices carry real-world implications, both domestic and external.
The difficult path ahead
Ultimately, significant progress on the road to peace would require an Israeli government that’s willing to make hard choices and sacrifices. That government currently doesn’t exist.
But would the next government be more amenable? Arguably, this would depend on many interlocking factors – most importantly, American pressure and engagement, in addition to “carrots” in the form of normalisation agreements[21] with Saudi Arabia and other Arab states. These factors could help shift domestic opinions and political calculus in Israel.
However, significant breakthroughs appear improbable before the country’s next elections, scheduled for 2026[22]. Until then, Trump remains the only one capable of meaningfully influencing the cost-benefit calculations in Jerusalem.
Notably, a strong desire for a sense of security[23] remains the most important consideration for Israelis, even if the means of achieving this are highly controversial.
Seen in this context, the demand in Trump’s plan that Hamas disarm and Gaza be demilitarised will be non-negotiable for any future Israeli government. Even then, extremist violence on either side would continue to pose the greatest threat to the prospects of co-existence.
On the positive side, history has shown that even in the most intractable conflicts, pathways to peace can be found when courage meets opportunity. The international community’s unprecedented unity, Trump’s new willingness to pressure both Hamas and Israel, and the sheer exhaustion on both sides can create that opportunity.
If this moment could be sustained – if the world maintains its focus beyond the initial ceasefire, if moderates on both sides find their voices – then perhaps the glimmer of hope offered today may become a light.
References
- ^ plan for a permanent ceasefire (www.bbc.com)
- ^ extremely vague (theconversation.com)
- ^ punitive measures (edition.cnn.com)
- ^ mercy of Israel and American goodwill (theconversation.com)
- ^ promised by Trump (www.theguardian.com)
- ^ Arab and Muslim states (theconversation.com)
- ^ Qatar and Turkey (www.timesofisrael.com)
- ^ changes to the draft (www.timesofisrael.com)
- ^ grudgingly acquiesced (www.dawn.com)
- ^ force Netanyahu into important concessions (www.theguardian.com)
- ^ contributed to Trump’s resolve (www.newyorker.com)
- ^ threat (www.jpost.com)
- ^ Israeli newspaper Haaretz (www.haaretz.com)
- ^ scorned (unwatch.org)
- ^ launched (www.theguardian.com)
- ^ joint condemnation (edition.cnn.com)
- ^ 157 of 193 UN member states (www.abc.net.au)
- ^ vetoing (press.un.org)
- ^ champion democratic values (www.abc.net.au)
- ^ prescribing which parties (www.theguardian.com)
- ^ agreements (www.reuters.com)
- ^ scheduled for 2026 (www.timesofisrael.com)
- ^ a sense of security (theconversation.com)
Authors: Eyal Mayroz, Senior Lecturer in Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Sydney
