Australia and Fiji sign a new defence pact as China launches a ballistic missile test in the Pacific. What does it all mean?
- Written by: Weekend Times
As part of his tour of the Pacific, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has signed a significant defence treaty with his Fijian counterpart Sitiveni Rabuka.
Called the Ocean of Peace Alliance or
Veitacini Treaty, the agreement is the latest step in Australia’s efforts to sign treaties that make it the regional “hub” for its Pacific Island country partner “spokes”. It follows:
- the Falepili Union with Tuvalu (2023)
- the Nauru–Australia Treaty (2024)
- the Pukpuk Treaty with Papua New Guinea (2025)
- the Nakamal Agreement with Vanuatu (2026).
New Solomon Islands Prime Minister Matthew Wale has requested Australia negotiate a bilateral treaty (building on their 2017 treaty). Australia is also in talks to make a treaty with Tonga.
Shortly after the agreement with Fiji was signed, China conducted a long-range missile test in the Pacific Ocean. The test provoked criticism from regional leaders, and underscored the need for Pacific Island countries to collectively think through their defence and security arrangements.
There is also much to digest in the Veitacini Treaty, and its accompanying Vuvale Union, which seeks to elevate security, economic ties, and people-to-people links.
The signal, and who it’s aimed at
Like the 1951 Australia, New Zealand and United States (ANZUS) Treaty, the security guarantee created by the Veitacini Treaty is largely unenforceable.
Article 6 provides that each party would “act to meet the common danger” of an armed attack in the Pacific on any of the parties. But this comes with the caveat that this action will occur “in accordance with its domestic processes”.
That qualified undertaking is much weaker than the more definite guarantee provided in the NATO Treaty, which states an “armed attack on one” party is deemed to constitute an attack on all parties, and they will consequently “exercise the right of individual or collective self-defence”.
As with the Nakamal Agreement Australia recently made with Vanuatu, the Veitacini Treaty is largely symbolic. Even if the treaty was enforceable, Australia relies on the US to defend it and would struggle to defend Fiji on its own.
Indeed, the symbolism of the Veitacini Treaty is the point. Look beyond the diplomatic platitudes of “friendship” and “mutual respect”, and the treaty is intended to send a signal about Fiji and Australia’s shared concerns about China’s strategic interest in the region.
Rabuka’s remarks at the signing ceremony were telling. He stressed he did not expect “severe pushback” from China, and that the alliance threatens neither country’s relationship with Beijing.
A leader does not repeatedly reassure a country that a treaty is not aimed at it unless everyone understands it is, at least partly, a signal to that country, and to a region watching to see whether Fiji has picked a side.
Questions the region should ask
First, does the Veitacini Treaty encourage the militarisation of the Pacific?
Article 12 provides that other Pacific Island countries can request to accede to the treaty if they are “in a position to further (…its) purposes and principles”.
This implies these countries will require militaries, which only PNG, Fiji, Tonga and New Zealand have. It also raises the risk of creating two tiers of security relationship in the region: the deeper integration generated by mutual defence treaties available to countries with militaries, and lesser security cooperation treaties to those without.
This may lead Pacific Island countries to conclude they should develop militaries if they are going to shape the regional strategic agenda. Indeed, it is something Solomon Islands has foreshadowed.
Given the costs, this may entrench dependence on Australia as the main provider of defence assistance. Militaries can also be a mixed blessing: useful in leading disaster responses; risky for internal instability (as Fiji’s 1987 and 2006 military coups demonstrate).
Second, how does an alliance sit with the region’s architecture?
Although pushed by Rabuka, the Blue Pacific Ocean of Peace Declaration was endorsed by Pacific Islands Forum leaders at their 2025 leaders’ meeting as a regional vision. Borrowing its name for a bilateral (for now) military alliance raises the question of who speaks for the Ocean of Peace: the forum, or Fiji and Australia?
With the Forum Secretariat’s headquarters in Suva, and Fiji positioning itself to host an Ocean of Peace Centre under the accompanying Vuvale Union, there is the risk of reinforcing perceptions that Pacific regionalism is already too Suva-centric. This is a longstanding grievance, particularly among Micronesian Forum members.
Third, has Fiji abandoned the regional commitment to “remain friends to all and enemies to none” reiterated in its 2025 National Security Strategy?
Pacific leaders have repeatedly emphasised that they reject “a choice between a China alternative and our traditional partners”. A mutual defence treaty is an unfriendly choice; it is to defend against threats from at least one other country.
Questions Fijians should ask
First, what are the costs of implementation?
Alliance obligations imply interoperability, sustained exercises, and equipping and maintaining forces able to – as Article 6 of the treaty provides – “act to meet the common danger”. The costs of achieving this are high, as Australia is regularly reminded in its efforts to keep up with the US. Will the Fiji budget stretch to meet these costs, or will it depend on Australian assistance?
The cost of mutual defence is particularly high. Although heavily qualified, a perceived need to make “insurance payments” on an alliance can see a country entrapped into following its ally into wars it wouldn’t choose. This could, in turn, risk entangling the region more broadly.
Second, how does the Veitacini Treaty interact with ANZUS?
Both treaties relate to armed attacks in the Pacific, with Australia as the ally that links the two. What obligations may arise, for example, if Australia responds to an attack on the US in the Pacific (say, on its massive Joint Region Marianas base on Guam), and in turn is attacked itself? will Fiji be expected to respond? Has Fiji unnecessarily made itself a strategic target? China’s ballistic missile test may be an unsubtle reminder to Fiji of the potential risks of this approach.
Third, how transparent will implementation be?
The treaty leaves governance to consultation mechanisms that the parties will “determine”. Previous agreements offer little comfort: implementation of the Falepili Union and the Nauru-Australia Treaty has proceeded largely out of public view. Nor is there any publicly available systematic assessment of whether the 2019 Fiji-Australia Vuvale Agreement (which was renewed in 2023) has delivered.
A good neighbour?
Australia has legitimate strategic concerns about China. But Australia’s response of Pacific treaty-making resembles “sugar-rush” diplomacy: announcements first, hard questions later.
Whether Australia and Fiji can answer these questions in ways that advance Australian, Fijian, and Pacific security will depend on transparency, honest evaluation, and genuine deference to the Pacific Islands Forum. One thing is certain: the region will notice whether Australia behaves like a good neighbour.
Joanne Wallis receives funding from the Australian Department of Defence, the Defence Science and Technology Group, and Defence SA. She is a Nonresident Senior Fellow of the Brookings Institution.
Salote Tagivakatini does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
