In a ‘ruptured’ world order, here’s how Australia can forge new middle-power partnerships

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney made an impassioned pitch in the Australian parliament for middle powers like Canada and Australia to build new coalitions in the “ruptured” global order that are less reliant on the United States.

In a post-rupture world, the nations that are trusted and can work together will be quicker to the punch, more effective in their responses, more proactive in shaping outcomes, and ultimately more secure and prosperous.

The question for middle powers like us is whether we preserve existing rules, write new rules to determine our security and prosperity, or let the great powers increasingly dictate outcomes.

Carney made a compelling case. So, how exactly would new coalitions of middle powers work, and which countries could Australia work with more closely?

The world order has “ruptured”, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney has warned – so it’s time for countries like Australia and New Zealand to forge a new, less US-reliant future. In this six-part series, we’ve asked top experts to explain what that future could look like – and the challenges that lie ahead. Why middle powers need to work together This enthusiasm for middle power coalitions poses some uncomfortable questions for Australia, given it requires a re-examination of our most important ally, the United States^[1]. In defence terms, Australia remains reliant on Washington’s presence and military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region. Much of our own military hardware simply cannot function without the US^[2]. Stepping away from the US alliance completely is not an option. This is why Canberra has expressed support for recent US and Israeli strikes in Tehran^[3], while not participating in them. Yet, Canberra can – and should – build up other relationships to hedge against dependence on an increasingly unreliable US^[4]. We can do this in areas such as trade, conflict prevention and international law. And with great powers increasingly willing to breach international law, middle powers have a great responsibility. By working together to safeguard international institutions, they can keep the global order functioning and try to restrain the behaviours of great powers when need be.

What would middle power alliances look like?

We need to be careful not to romanticise “middle powers”. The term often refers to countries that are not great powers, but can still exert influence and agency on the global stage through diplomacy or economic and military strength. This can include countries whose values or interests don’t align with Australia’s, such as Iran.

With that in mind, Australia should engage with other middle and smaller powers with a clear understanding of shared priorities:

• avoiding coercion by great powers

• shaping the architecture of international cooperation

• holding great powers to account as “responsible stakeholders” of the international order.

So, how would these arrangements work, practically speaking?

In his speech in Canberra, Carney advocated for a “dense web of connections” with other middle powers. He called it “variable geometry”, or creating different coalitions for different issues, based on common values and interests.

Variable geometry is not a retreat from multilateralism. It is its evolution.

Bilateral ties

Let’s start by looking at Australia’s ties with individual countries.

Of course, Australia has a strong alliance with New Zealand.

Beyond this, Canberra has signed a number of “comprehensive strategic partnerships” in recent years with countries in the region, including the ASEAN bloc of Southeast Asian countries, India, Indonesia, Singapore, Papua New Guinea, Malaysia, South Korea, and most recently, Vietnam.

These agreements can deepen cooperation in a range of areas of mutual concern, including security.

Australia also signed a new defence agreement with Japan in 2023 that allows for each country’s forces to operate in the other. This is a big deal – it was Japan’s first defence treaty^[5] with an international partner since 1960.

More recently, Australia has agreed to bilateral defence agreements with Papua New Guinea^[6], Indonesia^[7] and Timor-Leste^[8]. These pacts appear focused on “strategic denial” – preventing potential adversaries from achieving a foothold in our immediate region.

These bilateral agreements are regionally focused. A key question for Australia is whether it can also cooperate with countries like Canada, the UK, Germany and France in the Indo-Pacific region. This relies in part on their appetite to engage more here.

As Carney mentioned in Canberra, one potential area of cooperation is the Critical Minerals Production Alliance^[9] – an initiative launched by Canada to expand critical minerals production and processing capacity and diversify supply chains.

‘Lattice-work’ arrangements

Australia also has small coalitions in the region that allow for more flexible models of security cooperation.

Coalitions, rather than alliances with firm defence commitments, are more likely to flourish in a region as geo-strategically, economically and politically complex as the Indo-Pacific.

Australia’s key “minilateral” partnerships include:

• the Quad (Australia, US, Japan, India) and emerging “Squad” (Australia, Japan, Philippines, US)

• AUKUS (Australia, UK, US)

• the Trilateral Security Dialogue (Australia, Japan, US)

• Five Eyes (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK, US).

These all centre on US participation for a reason. Strategic minilateralism has long been Canberra’s way of anchoring Washington to the Indo-Pacific to provide a counterweight to China’s regional influence.

It is important to note that many middle powers hedging their bets by not aligning with either the US or China – such as Indonesia – still have strategies that rely on the US not withdrawing from the region.

The challenge now is how to cultivate new small-group arrangements for an uncertain future. Two new groupings that make a lot of sense are:

• Japan, South Korea and Australia These three US allies have been growing closer in recent years. Now, it makes even more sense for them to collaborate in ways that may not involve the US, including in economic security, maritime security and supporting international rules^[10].

• Australia, Japan and the Philippines Like Japan, Australia is increasing its defence cooperation with the Philippines, another US ally. The Philippines is at the coalface of a number of security challenges^[11] involving China.

Larger alliances

Australia can also deepen relationships with larger groupings in areas other than security.

In fact, there’s already a successful group of middle and small powers in the region that doesn’t include either the US or China: the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership^[12] (or CPTPP).

This is a free-trade agreement originally for Pacific Rim countries, comprising Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam. (Trump pulled the US out in 2017.)

The United Kingdom became the first non-Pacific nation to join in 2024; others like Uruguay, Costa Rica, the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia and the Philippines are interested in joining next.

The CPTPP has been successful in eliminating most tariffs^[13] among member countries, while also providing a platform for economic cooperation more broadly.

This agreement could expand even further to include the European Union, South Korea, Norway and Switzerland. Carney wants to “broker a bridge^[14]” between the EU and the CPTPP to “create a trading bloc of 1.5 billion people, grounded in common standards and shared values”.

The premature death of the global order

We need to avoid simplistic narratives about the state of the international order. Multilateralism isn’t dead. Global institutions still matter.

And people risk misunderstanding Carney’s call if they use it to suggest we need to funnel all of our efforts and resources into military deterrence alone. Middle and small powers play important roles in preserving international norms and creating new ones. This is more pressing in the current security environment.

And though the US is less interested in multilateralism at the moment, there is still a place – and a need – to encourage the great powers to cooperate on a wide range of issues, from trade to climate change to AI governance.

References

1. ^{^} most important ally, the United States (theconversation.com)
2. ^{^} cannot function without the US (theconversation.com)
3. ^{^} strikes in Tehran (www.theguardian.com)
4. ^{^} increasingly unreliable US (www.theguardian.com)
5. ^{^} first defence treaty (www.defence.gov.au)
6. ^{^} Papua New Guinea (www.dfat.gov.au)
7. ^{^} Indonesia (www.foreignminister.gov.au)
8. ^{^} Timor-Leste (www.pm.gov.au)
9. ^{^} Critical Minerals Production Alliance (www.reuters.com)
10. ^{^} economic security, maritime security and supporting international rules (www.ussc.edu.au)
11. ^{^} security challenges (manilastandard.net)
12. ^{^} the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (www.ussc.edu.au)
13. ^{^} eliminating most tariffs (www.ussc.edu.au)
14. ^{^} broker a bridge (www.politico.eu)