After an autocratic leader was toppled in Bangladesh, democratic renewal remains a work in progress
- Written by Intifar Chowdhury, Lecturer in Government, Flinders University
Last July, a powerful student-led uprising[1] in Bangladesh toppled the authoritarian, corrupt government led for 15 years by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina.
Bangladesh now shows modest signs of democratic recovery. Months into its tenure, a transitional government has reopened political and civic space[2], especially at universities, and begun reforming key state bodies.
Yet, violence and political retribution persist. This week, the interim government banned Hasina’s former party[3], the Awami League, under the country’s Anti-Terrorism Act while a tribunal investigates its role in the deaths of hundreds of protesters last year.
Elections have also been delayed and may not happen until 2026[4].
Amid this fragile transition, interim leader Muhammad Yunus, the 84-year-old Nobel-prize winning economist, has emerged as a rare figure of trust and calm. His popularity is so high, in fact, many are calling[5] for him to remain at the helm for another five years.
Given the uncertainty, Bangladesh faces some uncomfortable questions: can it afford electoral democracy right now? Or must stability come first, with democracy postponed until institutions can catch up?
And what happens if emergency governance becomes the new normal?
Fraught road to democratic renewal
According to a global democracy report[6], Bangladesh is still classified as an “electoral autocracy” — one of the few in the category that actually got worse in 2024.
The opposition, chiefly the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), has mounted a fierce challenge to the interim government’s legitimacy, arguing[7] it lacks a democratic mandate to implement meaningful reforms.
While the BNP and its former ally, the Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami, may appeal to segments of Bangladesh’s Muslim majority, their support is undermined by reputational baggage and limited resonance with younger voters[8].
At the same time, radical, right-wing, Islamist forces are exploiting the vacuum to reassert themselves, exacerbating tensions[9] between Muslims and the Hindu minority.
Economically, the country is also still reeling from the damage[10] done under Hasina’s regime.
Corruption hollowed out the banking system, leaving key institutions almost bankrupt. Although Yunus has taken steps[11] to stabilise the economy by bringing in competent officials, uncertainty continues to dampen investor confidence.
Inflation remains high. And unless job creation accelerates, especially for the youth, the seeds of further unrest are already planted.
In addition, law and order has deteriorated sharply. The country’s police force has been tainted by its association with the Alami League, and the former police chief is facing charges[12] of crimes against humanity.
Street crime is rising and minorities are experiencing growing harassment. Women feel deeply unsafe — both online[13] and on the streets[14]. Some parties are also seen as a threat[15] to countering violence against women.
Despite strong[16] laws on paper, weak law enforcement and victim-blaming are allowing[17] violence to flourish. It’s very difficult to hold perpetrators of crimes to account[18].
Bangladesh is also increasingly isolated[19] on the global stage.
India, long allied to Hasina’s government, has turned its back on the interim government. The United States is disengaging[20], as well. USAID had committed[21] nearly US$1 billion (A$1.6 billion) from 2021–26 to help improve the lives of Bangladeshis, but this funding has now been suspended[22].
Some gains on civil liberties
This year, Bangladesh improved slightly in Freedom House’s index on political freedoms and civil liberties, from a score of 40 points out of 100 last year to 45[23]. This is a step in the right direction.
Among the improvements in the past year, the government has:
The appointment of new election commissioners and the creation of advisory commissions for judicial and anti-corruption reform also signal an institutional reset in motion.
But gains remain fragile. While politically motivated cases against opposition figures have been dropped, new ones[24] have emerged against former ruling elites. The military’s policing role has expanded and harassment[25] of Awami League supporters by protesters persists.
In addition, media freedom remains heavily constrained[26], with a human rights group reporting the interim government had targeted hundreds of journalists[27] in the past eight months.
In this fractured environment, urgent reforms are needed. But these need to be sustainable, as well. Whether the interim government has the time, authority or support to deliver them remains in doubt. The government also needs to deliver on its promise to hold free and fair elections.
A new party on the rise
The country’s politically engaged youth have not been dissuaded by these issues. Rather, they are trying to reshape the political landscape.
The new National Citizen Party (NCP)[28] was formed in early 2025 by leaders of last year’s student uprising. It has positioned itself as the party to bring a “second republic[29]” to Bangladesh. Drawing from historical models from France and the US, the party envisions a new elected, constituent assembly and constitution.
With organisational support and tacit backing from the interim government, the NCP has rapidly grown into a viable political force.
Still, the party faces a steep, uphill climb. Its broad, ideological umbrella risks diluting its message, blurring[30] its distinctions with the BNP.
For the NCP to turn protests into policy, it must sharpen its identity, consolidate its base, and avoid being co-opted or outflanked.
Whether this moment of political flux leads to real transformation or yet another cycle of disillusionment will depend on how boldly — and how sustainably— the interim government and new actors like the NCP act. And they must not draw out the process of transition for too long.
References
- ^ student-led uprising (theconversation.com)
- ^ reopened political and civic space (freedomhouse.org)
- ^ banned Hasina’s former party (www.aljazeera.com)
- ^ may not happen until 2026 (www.aljazeera.com)
- ^ calling (www.facebook.com)
- ^ report (www.v-dem.net)
- ^ arguing (www.theguardian.com)
- ^ younger voters (thediplomat.com)
- ^ tensions (www.thestar.com.my)
- ^ damage (www.crisisgroup.org)
- ^ taken steps (www.crisisgroup.org)
- ^ facing charges (www.thehindu.com)
- ^ online (www.unwomen.org)
- ^ on the streets (www.unwomen.org)
- ^ threat (images.thedailystar.net)
- ^ strong (www.thedailystar.net)
- ^ allowing (www.thedailystar.net)
- ^ account (www.unwomen.org)
- ^ isolated (www.theguardian.com)
- ^ disengaging (www.reuters.com)
- ^ committed (bd.usembassy.gov)
- ^ has now been suspended (thegeopolitics.com)
- ^ to 45 (freedomhouse.org)
- ^ new ones (researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk)
- ^ harassment (www.nbcnews.com)
- ^ heavily constrained (en.prothomalo.com)
- ^ targeted hundreds of journalists (www.thehindu.com)
- ^ National Citizen Party (NCP) (www.thedailystar.net)
- ^ second republic (www.thedailystar.net)
- ^ blurring (www.internationalaffairs.org.au)
Authors: Intifar Chowdhury, Lecturer in Government, Flinders University
