As the Myanmar junta’s hold on power weakens, could the devastating war be nearing a conclusion?

It has now been four years since the Myanmar military launched its cataclysmic coup^[1] against the democratically elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi on February 1 2021, starting a civil war that has devastated the country.

Suu Kyi remains locked up, as do countless other activists and regime opponents. There is no easy resolution in sight.

Indeed, the country is at a nadir. The war has sparked an economic crisis that has destroyed Myanmar’s health^[2] and education^[3] systems. Half the population now lives in poverty, double^[4] the rate from before the coup. The deteriorating electricity network causes widespread blackouts^[5].

According to the United Nations^[6], more than 5,000 civilians have been killed and 3.3 million people have been displaced by the fighting. More than 27,000 people have also been arrested, with reports^[7] of sexual violence and torture rife.

Nevertheless, opposition forces – including ethnic armies and the People’s Defence Force militias drawn from the civilian population – have been gathering strength, with a string of victories against the junta’s army.

The regime now controls^[8] less than half the country. And recent strategic losses are weighing heavily on the military leaders, raising questions^[9] about whether the government could suddenly collapse like the Assad regime in Syria late last year.

As the war enters a fifth year, there are two significant things to watch that could determine the country’s future – the battleground gains made by the opposition forces and the state of the failing economy.

Junta under pressure on the battlefield

Following the opposition Three Brotherhood Alliance^[10]’s battleground successes^[11] in late 2023, China brokered a ceasefire between the junta and alliance in northern Shan State.

When that ceasefire ended last June, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), one of the members of the alliance, captured the key trading town of Lashio, as well as the junta’s nearby Northeast Regional Military Command^[12]. It was the first time one of the 14 regional military commands had fallen to an opposition group in more than 50 years of military rule.

China has recently brokered another ceasefire^[13] between the MNDAA and the military, according to the Chinese foreign ministry. The terms have not been made public, but unless the insurgents relinquish Lashio and the military command – which is unlikely – it won’t alter the balance of power.

In December, the military lost another command centre^[14] in Rakhine State in western Myanmar to the Arakan Army, another member of the Three Brotherhood Alliance. The Arakan Army now controls 14 of that state’s 17 townships^[15].

The Arakan Army, too, said recently it is open to political dialogue^[16] to potentially end the fighting. But it, too, is only likely to stop its military offensives for extremely favourable terms.

In a major study undertaken in late 2024, the BBC assessed^[17] the junta only had full control of 21% of Myanmar’s territory. Ethnic armies and other opposition forces^[18] controlled 42% of the country, while the remaining areas were contested.

In response, the junta has intensified its “scorched earth^[19]” tactics in areas outside its control, including indiscriminate and deliberate strikes against civilians. With dwindling reserves of willing fighters, air power is the main combat advantage it holds over the opposition forces.

Economic woes

Myanmar’s economic situation^[20] four years after the coup shows, starkly^[21], just how much has been lost.

Myanmar is now experiencing a full-blown economic^[22] and currency^[23] crisis.

The incremental gains in economic development^[24], education, nutrition and health care^[25] of recent decades have been reversed^[26] very quickly. Three-quarters of the population is now living a subsistence^[27] existence.

Many young people are fleeing^[28] abroad, joining^[29] resistance groups, or eking out dangerous livelihoods on the margins. To make matters worse, the junta activated^[30] a longstanding but dormant conscription law^[31] last February to boost its dwindling forces. Those who refuse^[32] the draft face five years in prison.

In response to the Arakan Army’s successes, the junta is also isolating much of Rakhine State. This is contributing to widespread poverty and a looming famine^[33], which could affect two million people.

And in an attempt to control the digital space, the junta enacted a sweeping new cybersecurity law^[34] earlier this month. People can now be imprisoned for using a virtual private network or sharing information from banned websites, among many other offences.

Could Myanmar fall apart?

The ASEAN regional bloc, chaired by Malaysia this year, has done little to solve the crisis, although it hasn’t accepted the junta’s hollow plans to hold elections^[35] this year.

Disagreements among the ASEAN members over strategy have ensured that little progress has been made. Thailand recently broke ranks to invite the junta’s foreign minister^[36] to regional talks about border security, even though the junta currently controls few of the country’s borders^[37].

An accelerated economic deterioration could contribute to further unrest and drive even more migrants to neighbouring countries. Already, the millions of Myanmar migrants^[38] living in Thailand have precipitated anti-migrant protests and mass arrests.

So, given the combustible state of the country, could the junta’s hold on power suddenly collapse^[39] like the Assad regime in Syria last year?

It’s not likely. Unlike Syria, the opposition in Myanmar is not heavily backed by major international players. China’s support for various insurgent actors comes and goes depending on political calculations, while the United States and European Union have provided little material support.

In addition, the military has been effectively running Myanmar for 60 years and is well practised in counterinsurgency strategies. Although defections^[40] from the military continue, the conscription law is bolstering its numbers of – mostly reluctant – soldiers.

However, the fall of Syria’s oppressive government – as well as the government in Myanmar’s neighbour, Bangladesh^[41] – demonstrates how fragile long-standing regimes can be, particularly when faced with persistent challenges from armed groups and a motivated population^[42].

And as in Syria, there are fears – particularly within China – that Myanmar could splinter along ethnic lines. The deteriorating security situation has led China to send its own private security corporations^[43] to secure its strategic investments in the country and become an active ceasefire deal-maker.

Even if the junta can be ousted, creating a workable federal system that involves power-sharing among the complex patchwork of ethnic groups will be a difficult task. The question of how to reintegrate nearly a million Rohingya^[44] displaced across the border in Bangladesh is another daunting challenge.

However, for the first time in years, there is optimism that opposition forces could eventually succeed in vanquishing the junta. Then begins the arduous task of rebuilding a shattered nation.

References

1. ^{^} coup (theconversation.com)
2. ^{^} health (lordslibrary.parliament.uk)
3. ^{^} education (eastasiaforum.org)
4. ^{^} double (www.undp.org)
5. ^{^} widespread blackouts (www.irrawaddy.com)
6. ^{^} According to the United Nations (news.un.org)
7. ^{^} reports (theconversation.com)
8. ^{^} controls (www.bbc.com)
9. ^{^} questions (www.cfr.org)
10. ^{^} Three Brotherhood Alliance (www.aljazeera.com)
11. ^{^} successes (theconversation.com)
12. ^{^} Northeast Regional Military Command (theconversation.com)
13. ^{^} ceasefire (www.abc.net.au)
14. ^{^} command centre (www.irrawaddy.com)
15. ^{^} 14 of that state’s 17 townships (www.rfa.org)
16. ^{^} open to political dialogue (myanmar-now.org)
17. ^{^} assessed (www.bbc.com)
18. ^{^} Ethnic armies and other opposition forces (360info.org)
19. ^{^} scorched earth (www.hrw.org)
20. ^{^} economic situation (www.lowyinstitute.org)
21. ^{^} starkly (thediplomat.com)
22. ^{^} economic (documents.worldbank.org)
23. ^{^} currency (www.reuters.com)
24. ^{^} economic development (www.nationthailand.com)
25. ^{^} health care (www.thinkglobalhealth.org)
26. ^{^} reversed (www.thenewhumanitarian.org)
27. ^{^} subsistence (www.undp.org)
28. ^{^} fleeing (thediplomat.com)
29. ^{^} joining (myanmar-now.org)
30. ^{^} activated (thediplomat.com)
31. ^{^} conscription law (www.usip.org)
32. ^{^} refuse (www.abc.net.au)
33. ^{^} famine (www.undp.org)
34. ^{^} cybersecurity law (www.voanews.com)
35. ^{^} elections (www.aljazeera.com)
36. ^{^} foreign minister (apnews.com)
37. ^{^} borders (x.com)
38. ^{^} millions of Myanmar migrants (thailand.iom.int)
39. ^{^} suddenly collapse (www.cfr.org)
40. ^{^} defections (www.aljazeera.com)
41. ^{^} Bangladesh (www.bbc.com)
42. ^{^} motivated population (theconversation.com)
43. ^{^} private security corporations (theconversation.com)
44. ^{^} Rohingya (www.tandfonline.com)