Why Bashar al-Assad’s security state collapsed so dramatically in Syria

Sometimes nothing happens for years. And then years – decades even – happen in a few days.

Over the past ten days, a range of Syrian rebel forces led by the group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) have mounted an offensive against the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad. They first captured Aleppo, Syria’s second-largest city and economic hub, and then swept rapidly south through Hama, Homs and finally Damascus.

The rebels were met with little to no resistance from the Syrian regime, nor its Russian, Iranian or Hezbollah allies. And so, the 54-year-old regime led by Hafez al-Assad and then his son Bashar has now fallen.

While it may seem like these events came out of nowhere, the rapid fall of the Assad regime has a long history.

A ‘long-breath’ strategy of appeasement

For decades, Hafez al-Assad, Syria’s autocratic ruler from 1970–2000, had adopted a pragmatic strategy that involved building relationships with a sometimes unlikely array of state and non-state allies, proxies and clients. This “long-breath^[1]” strategy was helpful in keeping relations with everyone open, even if those relations were in many cases extremely precarious.

For example, the regime gave preferential treatment to minorities (predominantly Alawis and other quasi-Shiite groups) and other benefits to the Sunni and Christian establishment. These policies meant these groups had a vested interest in the continuation of the regime.

Bashar al-Assad continued this tradition when he came to power following his father’s death.

However, he also initiated liberalisation policies in the early years of his rule that emboldened a new genre of loyalist paramilitary forces. These were often headed by many of Syria’s newly minted business elite who, in large part, created armed groups to protect their economic fiefdoms. These pro-state militia groups tended to be less disciplined than the national army, and more corrupt.

In March 2011, the uprisings across the Middle East spilled over into Syria, leading to the first public protests in the country in decades. Determined to avoid Libya’s fate of external intervention, the Syrian regime quickly opened fire on unarmed protesters^[2], killing many.

This was the start of Syria’s devastating 14-year civil war.

The emergence of Russian-led armed factions

The Russians joined the conflict in mid-2015. One of their conditions of entry into Syria: a single, traditionally structured military command for them to work with.

This necessitated various local militia groups, such as the National Defence Force and Kataeb al-Baath, being absorbed into the Syrian army through the establishment^[3] of a new Fourth Corps aligned with the Russians.

Due to the unruly behaviour of many of these militias, Russia later set up a Fifth Corps in an attempt to restructure the Syrian army around personnel who were both reliable and loyal to Moscow.

Then, reconciliation agreements between the regime, Russia and various rebel groups from 2016 to 2018 facilitated^[4] the integration of armed rebel groups into the Russian-led Fourth and Fifth Corps, as well as an Iranian-led division of the Syrian army. Under the terms of these reconciliation deals, men in rebel-held communities who had deserted or dodged their mandatory Syrian army conscription were expected to join within six months.

As Syrian researcher Abdullah al-Jabassini has explained^[5], these agreements led to a precarious security situation in southern Syria.

The agreements aimed to end fighting and restore state control over rebel-held areas. However, many of the once-rebel factions who were now, on paper at least, linked to the Syrian army, Russia and Iran, continued to operate with relative freedom and impunity. This ran counter to the regime’s presumed strategy of re-consolidating its control over the country.

Many of these local armed groups continued^[6] to provide security to their communities, even erecting barriers at the entrances of each city to prevent the entry of the Syrian Army.

A former Syrian governor told me in an interview in 2022:

In Houran [southern Syria], generally, there is no regime control. It remains impossible for the regime to enter Busra al-Sham, Daraa City, Tafas and their surroundings, due to certain considerations or guarantees. But of course, there are no guarantees but their arms.

For the last few years, the Syrian regime, Russia and Iran seemed to have some ability to control these ex-rebel groups and militias that supposedly now operated under their purview.

However, this control was an illusion. In the past ten days, the regime’s forces have completely disintegrated in the face of the opposition’s offensive.

The army’s fractured levels of control and lack of resources, the dire economic sitution^[7] in the country (which resulted in soldiers not being paid), and the low morale and corruption at almost every level could not sustain a military – or a security state.

A state-in-waiting

For more than 50 years, Syria was a suffocating kingdom of silence. People had little ability to collaborate or negotiate in meaningful ways. This made forming any common vision for Syria’s political future a daunting undertaking.

Under Assad, Syria experts Robin Yassin-Kassab and Leila Al-Shami have written^[8] that “the most cunning and sycophantic” prospered.

[…]there was no culture in the deep sense of the word, only a framework empty of meaning populated by hired intellectuals, with the exception of a very few real thinkers, who were marginalised.

But since the relative freezing of active combat in 2020, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Syrian National Army (linked to the Syrian Interim Government and Turkey) and the Kurdish-led forces in northeastern Syria have had time to learn and consolidate.

They have spent^[9] the past few years training and preparing their armed forces. They have also developed complex systems^[10] of governance, capable of meeting the needs of millions of people.

Across northern Syria, these opposition groups and their political wings have set up a state-in-waiting, with ministries of economy, trade, education and humanitarian affairs. The groups also established their own civil and land registration^[11] systems, something normally considered the sole purview of recognised states.

It’s right to be wary and sceptical, particularly of HTS’s supposed transformation from al-Qaeda affiliate to national liberation movement that will represent all Syrians. However, the early signs are promising. The immediate release of prisoners^[12] from the Assad regime’s infamous prison system, for example, was a deeply symbolic move aimed at endearing rebel forces to the Syrian population.

When it liberated Aleppo, HTS fighters also secured banks to avoid looting. To build trust and boost morale among the local population, it diverted the electricity being funnelled to large factories to civilian residences.

The group’s leader, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, now going by his legal name Ahmed al-Sharaa, has said he is willing to dissolve HTS in favour of creating^[13] a new structure that is more representative and capable of serving the current needs of all Syrians.

A new chapter is beginning for Syria, its people and the world. The Syrian regime, a cult of personality built on the Assads, has fallen, offering hope to other people in the Middle East and beyond who continue to live under authoritarian dictatorships that change is indeed possible.

May Syrians’ 2011 cry^[14] of “Dignity! Freedom! Bread!” continue to prevail.

References

1. ^{^} long-breath (tcf.org)
2. ^{^} opened fire on unarmed protesters (www.hrw.org)
3. ^{^} establishment (www.chathamhouse.org)
4. ^{^} facilitated (www.middleeasteye.net)
5. ^{^} explained (cadmus.eui.eu)
6. ^{^} continued (carnegieendowment.org)
7. ^{^} dire economic sitution (newlinesinstitute.org)
8. ^{^} have written (www.plutobooks.com)
9. ^{^} spent (www.cnn.com)
10. ^{^} complex systems (cadmus.eui.eu)
11. ^{^} registration (www.ssoar.info)
12. ^{^} prisoners (www.bloomsbury.com)
13. ^{^} creating (edition.cnn.com)
14. ^{^} 2011 cry (rest.neptune-prod.its.unimelb.edu.au)