This is the playbook the Iranian regime uses to crack down on protests – but will it work this time?
- Written by Amin Naeni, PhD Candidate in International Relations, Deakin University
In late December, Tehran’s bazaar merchants began[1] protesting against Iran’s theocratic rulers over the sharp collapse of the currency.
These protests quickly spread nationwide, although the level of participation remained limited, initially. The situation changed when Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son of Iran’s former shah, issued[2] a public call for demonstrations last Thursday and Friday.
This altered the dynamics of the protest movement. The authorities appeared not to take Pahlavi’s call seriously, suggesting they did not believe the US-based Pahlavi had significant influence among the population. State media openly mocked[3] the call.
Yet, Pahlavi’s message spread rapidly online. His video on Instagram has received more than 90 million views[4] and nearly 500,000 comments as of January 13. These are unprecedented figures for any Persian content on social media.
Huge crowds then took to the streets[5], reportedly spreading to all of Iran’s 31 provinces[6], with many chanting for Pahlavi’s return to the country.
This marked the first time since the 1979 Iranian revolution[7] that a political figure issued a protest call explicitly framed around regime change and people responded at scale.
In 2009, Mir-Hossein Mousavi, who lost a contested presidential election to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, mobilised large protests[8] that became known as the Green Movement[9], but these largely called for reforms rather than regime change.
Other protest movements in Iran, including those in 2017–18, 2019–20 and 2022, were social media-driven and largely leaderless. This time, the protests have combined online tools with clear leadership, making the potential reach and overall impact of the movement even greater.
Internet shutdown
As the protests intensified, the authorities realised they had underestimated Pahlavi’s impact. In response, the regime imposed a complete internet shutdown[10] of the country on January 8. Telephone lines and SMS services were[11] also cut.
Since then, more than 85 million Iranians have been living in an information vacuum, with the only news coming from state-run sources. The regime has made only a handful of its outlets available online, including Tasnim and Fars, both of which are affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
Although Iranians have often found ways around online restrictions using VPNs in the past, this isn’t possible when the entire internet is shut down.
The authorities used a complete digital blackout combined with violent suppression to crack down on the 2019 protests when 1,500 people are believed to have been killed[12].
This time, the only difference is the limited availability of Starlink satellite internet. Very few Iranians have access to Starlink, but it has allowed a small number[13] of videos to reach the outside world.
Hundreds have reportedly been killed[14] in the state crackdown so far – perhaps even thousands[15] – with more than 10,000 people arrested.
The government is now intensifying[16] efforts to disrupt Starlink signals, as well.
Meanwhile, protesters have tried to turn the tables on the authorities by disabling the ubiquitous surveillance cameras that have long been a key part of the regime’s strategy to crack down on dissent.
Iran’s digital authoritarianism
Alongside China and Russia, Iran has one of the most sophisticated[17] systems of digital authoritarianism in the world. The regime has developed three core strategies:
1) Internet shutdown. The regime frequently imposes internet restrictions, or disables it completely, to hamper protesters’ ability to coordinate. This tactic also limits international awareness of the protest movement and pressure on the regime to stop killing civilians, making repression easier.
2) Facial recognition cameras. The regime also relies on this technology, largely imported[18] from China, to identify and arrest protesters.
3) Control the narrative. The third strategy is spreading propaganda and disinformation[19] aimed at shaping public perception and justifying state suppression. This messaging is also crafted to discourage people from taking part in protests.
In recent days, the regime has unleashed all of these three strategies, accompanied by gunfire[20]. The last time all three strategies were used together was in 2019, when reformist President Hassan Rouhani was in office. (In 2022, the internet was cut off on a regional basis.)
How the regime is portraying the protests
So, as the Iranian population is plunged into a blackout, the state media and officials have begun constructing their preferred narrative of the events.
Linking protesters to the United States and Israel is one of the oldest propaganda[21] techniques used by the regime, and it is once again being promoted heavily.
Iran’s current president, Masoud Pezeshkian, another reformist, has said[22] “the enemy has brought trained terrorists into the country” and those involved in the unrest are not ordinary Iranians. Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the speaker of Iran’s parliament, has also alleged[23] “the enemy has entered a phase of terrorist warfare”.
In addition, Tasnim News Agency has claimed[24] that “terrorist actions” have resulted in a significant number of “martyrs” – referring to both protesters and security forces who have been killed – blaming “agents” of the US and Israel for the killings. Reports of arrests[25] of alleged “Mossad agents” are also being broadcast repeatedly.
The construction of such narratives is an obvious attempt to delegitimise the protesters and present the regime’s harsh response as an unavoidable measure taken in the name of public security. In this framing, the authorities can claim they are neutralising an enemy plan rather than targeting ordinary Iranians. The messaging is also aimed at deterring undecided groups from joining the movement.
Narratives centred on terrorism and the alleged role of the US and Israel are also used to prevent the erosion of support within the regime’s traditional base. While the regime’s hardcore supporters are strident believers in the ideology of the Islamic revolution, the leaders may fear their support could waver under the current economic conditions and sustained popular unrest.
Emphasising the role of “enemies” serves to reinforce the narrative of longstanding foreign hostilities, rather than a domestic uprising.
While the securitisation of protesters and the digital blackout have intensified, protesters continue to risk their lives in pursuit of freedom. They hope their voices will be heard around the world, despite the digital darkness.
References
- ^ began (www.theguardian.com)
- ^ issued (www.instagram.com)
- ^ mocked (x.com)
- ^ 90 million views (www.instagram.com)
- ^ took to the streets (www.bbc.com)
- ^ 31 provinces (time.com)
- ^ 1979 Iranian revolution (theconversation.com)
- ^ mobilised large protests (www.npr.org)
- ^ Green Movement (apnews.com)
- ^ internet shutdown (www.cbc.ca)
- ^ were (www.cbc.ca)
- ^ 1,500 people are believed to have been killed (www.reuters.com)
- ^ small number (www.bbc.com)
- ^ reportedly been killed (www.bbc.com)
- ^ thousands (time.com)
- ^ intensifying (www.forbes.com)
- ^ one of the most sophisticated (www.globalpolicyjournal.com)
- ^ imported (www.nbcnews.com)
- ^ propaganda and disinformation (www.tandfonline.com)
- ^ accompanied by gunfire (time.com)
- ^ oldest propaganda (www.tandfonline.com)
- ^ said (www.tasnimnews.com)
- ^ alleged (t.me)
- ^ claimed (t.me)
- ^ arrests (t.me)
Authors: Amin Naeni, PhD Candidate in International Relations, Deakin University
