How France’s political dramas threaten more instability in violence-wracked New Caledonia
- Written by Denise Fisher, Visiting Fellow, ANU Centre for European Studies and Department of Pacific Affairs, Australian National University
The unprecedented political crisis in France is increasingly being felt thousands of kilometres away in the South Pacific.
On October 16, French Prime Minister Sebastien Lecornu survived two no-confidence motions[1] – one by just 18 votes. He is expected to face further challenges in the coming months as he seeks to pass the 2026 budget.
The parliamentary votes follow weeks of upheaval. Former Prime Minister Francois Bayrou resigned in September after he lost a no confidence vote[2] himself. His successor, Lecornu, took over three weeks to appoint a cabinet, then resigned after it fell apart within a matter of hours. Six days later, he was re-appointed[3].
Three failed referendums
All of this matters not just for France, but for the continuing process of self-determination in New Caledonia, Australia’s closest eastern neighbour.
Finding agreement on New Caledonia’s future has not been smooth following the expiration of 30 years of agreements[4] on the territory’s status without a conclusive outcome in 2021.
Three independence referendums on New Caledonia’s independence were held from 2018 to 2021, all of which failed. The first two votes showed a large and growing Indigenous Kanak minority supporting independence, reaching 47%.
The third referendum was contentious. Kanak voters boycotted the vote after France’s overseas territories minister refused their request to postpone it due to the pandemic. That minister was none other than Lecornu, the current prime minister.
Independence leaders have not forgotten his role in this. They declined to meet with French President Emmanuel Macron[5] early last year simply because Lecornu (then the defence minister) was in his delegation.
In September this year, the core pro-independence alliance, the Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front (FLNKS), slammed[6] Lecornu’s appointment as prime minister, accusing him of initiating “hostilities leading to the current chaos” in New Caledonia.
New Caledonia’s future in the balance
The political stalemate in the territory has only deepened since 2021. Pro-France loyalists demanded a relaxation of the voting eligibility provisions in local elections, which would weaken the Indigenous vote. Despite Kanak pro-independence opposition, Macron imposed the eligibility change unilaterally. This led to violent protests[7] throughout 2024.
After repeated failed attempts at dialogue, a new overseas territories minister, Manuel Valls, a former prime minister with close ties in New Caledonia, managed to negotiate the Bougival Accord[8] in July of this year.
The agreement would create a new “state” for New Caledonia within France, with newly devolved powers, especially in foreign affairs. The territory would also be put on a path to acquire full sovereignty over its affairs under strict conditions.
Local elections, currently due in November, would be postponed, and the accord would be put to a referendum in February 2026. Both of these moves would require French legislation to enact.
However, political turmoil in Paris has hindered these processes.
Not only has Valls now been replaced by a new minister unfamiliar with New Caledonia, but the legislative timetable to implement the accord has slipped.
Lecornu has flagged he will take immediate action[9] to try to salvage the process. However, his government remains vulnerable to more instability.
In New Caledonia, the accord is also looking shaky. All the leaders of the FLNKS (the pro-independence coalition) who signed it in Paris in July have since withdrawn their signatures[10].
FLNKS leader Emmanuel Tjibaou insists[11] local elections be held in November to provide a democratic basis for future negotiations and warned against forcing a postponement.
FLNKS President Christian Tein has called the accord a test[12] of respect for the Kanak voice and “consolidating or fracturing civil peace”. He has previously noted[13] “the embers are not yet extinguished” from last year’s violence.
Two moderate independence parties in New Caledonia support the accord. However, a growing list of other groups oppose it, including the main Kanak union, the Kanak Protestant church[14], and the Customary Senate[15] representing Kanak chiefs.
Threat of renewed violence
The situation is loaded with insecurity and fear. Evidence of last year’s violence – burned-out businesses, schools and homes – are constant reminders of the tenuous situation. Even pro-France leaders[16] are saying the accord cannot proceed without the FLNKS.
The fragility of Macron’s government means ongoing uncertainty in New Caledonia. And with Macron under constant pressure from Marine Le Pen’s far-right National Rally party[17], there is little enthusiasm for granting more autonomy to New Caledonia, a chief strategic asset.
Pacific island leaders are concerned. In June, the regional Melanesian Spearhead Group summit reaffirmed support for the pro-independence movement[18], and commissioned leaders to write to Macron to urge dialogue on decolonisation.
Leaders in the Pacific Islands Forum typically refer to New Caledonia in their annual summit communiques. This year, their message[19] to France was more pointed.
The leaders recalled two issues that made France deeply unpopular in the region in the 1980s and 1990s: its nuclear testing legacy in French Polynesia, and its treatment of New Caledonia.
On New Caledonia, they called for dialogue involving all stakeholders – a clear reference to the pro-independence group, FLNKS.
References
- ^ survived two no-confidence motions (www.franceinfo.fr)
- ^ lost a no confidence vote (www.theguardian.com)
- ^ was re-appointed (www.franceinfo.fr)
- ^ the expiration of 30 years of agreements (link.springer.com)
- ^ declined to meet with French President Emmanuel Macron (la1ere.franceinfo.fr)
- ^ slammed (www.facebook.com)
- ^ led to violent protests (www.lowyinstitute.org)
- ^ negotiate the Bougival Accord (www.lowyinstitute.org)
- ^ flagged he will take immediate action (la1ere.franceinfo.fr)
- ^ have since withdrawn their signatures (www.lnc.nc)
- ^ insists (la1ere.franceinfo.fr)
- ^ a test (www.lnc.nc)
- ^ noted (www.mediapart.fr)
- ^ main Kanak union, the Kanak Protestant church (la1ere.franceinfo.fr)
- ^ Customary Senate (la1ere.franceinfo.fr)
- ^ pro-France leaders (www.lnc.nc)
- ^ National Rally party (abcnews.go.com)
- ^ reaffirmed support for the pro-independence movement (www.facebook.com)
- ^ message (forumsec.org)
Authors: Denise Fisher, Visiting Fellow, ANU Centre for European Studies and Department of Pacific Affairs, Australian National University
